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Abstract. We consider compositional properties of reactive systems that are se-
cure in a cryptographic sense. We follow the well-known simulatability approach
of modern cryptography, i.e., the specification is an ideal system and a real system
should in some sense simulate this ideal one. We show that if a system consists
of a polynomial number of arbitrary ideal subsystems such that each of them
has a secure implementation in the sense of blackbox simulatability, then one
can securely replace all ideal subsystems with their respective secure counter-
parts without destroying the blackbox simulatability relation. We further prove
our theorem for universal simulatability by showing that blackbox simulatability
implies universal simulatability under reasonable assumptions. We show all our
results with concrete security.
1 Introduction
In recent times, the analysis of cryptographic protocols has been getting more and more
attention, and thus the demand for general frameworks for representing cryptographic
protocols and their security requirements has been rising. To enable a cryptographically
correct analysis of cryptographic protocols, such frameworks have to capture proba-
bilistic behaviors, complexity-theoretically bounded adversaries as well as a reactive
environment of the protocol, i.e., continuous interaction with users and an adversary,
e.g., in many protocol runs. Clearly, such frameworks further have to be rigorously
defined to avoid ambiguities and to enable convincing proofs. Moreover, it is highly
desirable that such frameworks provide a link to formal methods, i.e., to tool-supported
verification of cryptographic protocols. Tool support can minimize flaws, which occur
quite often if the distributed-systems aspects of cryptographic protocols are analyzed
by hand. One ingredient for this is that the model should contain an abstract machine
model besides Turing machines. The model of Backes, Pfitzmann and Waidner [2, 3] is
suitable for all these requirements and we use it as a rigorous foundation of this work.
The model of [2, 3] introduced a notion of security-preserving refinement, called
reactive simulatability. This notion captures the idea of refinement that preserves not
only integrity properties but also confidentiality properties. Intuitively it can be stated
⋆ An earlier version of this work appeared in [1].
as follows, when applied to the relation between a real and an ideal system:1 Everything
that can happen to users of the real system in the presence of an arbitrary adversary A
can also happen to the same users with the ideal system, where attack capabilities are
usually much more restricted, in the presence of another adversary A′. In particular, it
comprises confidentiality because the notion of what happens to users, called their view,
not only includes their in- and outputs to the system, but also their communication with
the adversary. This includes whether the adversary can guess secrets of the users or
partial information about them. As it is often desirable to impose further restrictions
on how the adversary A′ against the ideal service is constructed, simulatability comes
in different flavors. The two most prominent ones (besides general simulatability as
described above, which does not impose any restriction on A′) are universal simulata-
bility, which states that A′ has to be independent of the actual users of the protocol, and
the (seemingly) more restrictive notion of black-box simulatability, which states that
A′ consists of the original adversary A and a simulator that may only depend on the
protocol itself.
One of the key results in the considered model is a composition theorem [2, 3]. It
states that if a larger system is designed based on a specification of a subsystem, and
the implementation of the subsystem is later plugged in, the entire implementation of
the larger system is as secure as its design in the same sense of reactive simulatability.
This theorem (as well as its predecessor [4] for a synchronous reactive model) holds
for all variants of simulatability (general, universal, and blackbox), but it is restricted
to replacing one system. Obviously, a constant number of systems can then be replaced
by applying the theorem multiple times.
In this work, we present a more comprehensive composition theorem for black-
box simulatability by showing that a polynomial number (in a security parameter) of
arbitrary systems can be composed without destroying the simulatability relation. The
proof relies on what is often called a “standard hybrid argument” as first used in [5].
We further show that universal simulatability implies black-box simulatability under
reasonable assumptions. This is of independent interest, but it in particular allows us
to prove our theorem also for universal simulatability. We show all our results with
concrete security.
Related Literature. Simulatability was first sketched for secure multi-party function
evaluation, i.e., for the computation of one output tuple from one tuple of secret inputs
from each participant in [6] and defined (with different degrees of generality and rig-
orosity) in [7–10]. While composition theorems for special cases were proven in [8,
9], the first general composition theorem for non-reactive simulatability was proven in
[10].
An important step towards compositionality results of reactive systems was taken
in [11, 12], where the cryptographic security of specific systems was directly defined
and verified using a formal language, the π-calculus, and security was expressed using
observational equivalence. This notion is even stronger than reactive simulatability be-
cause the entire environment (corresponding to users and adversary together for reactive
1 Other terms are implementation and specification, or in special cases cryptographic and ab-
stract system.
simulatability) must not be able to distinguish the implementation and the specification.
Correspondingly, the concrete specifications used were not abstract; they essentially
comprise the actual protocols including all cryptographic details. Composition was de-
fined in the calculus by defining processes with “holes” for other processes, which then
allows for composing a constant number of systems.
A reactive simulatability definition was first proposed (after some earlier sketches,
in particular in [13, 14, 10]) in [15]. It is synchronous, covers a restricted class of proto-
cols (straightline programs with restricted operators, in view of the constructive result of
this paper), and simulatability is defined for the information-theoretic case only, where
it can be done with a quantification over input sequences instead of active honest users.
The first composition theorem for reactive simulatability was given in [4] for a gen-
eral synchronous reactive model, followed by essentially the same composition theo-
rem [2] in the corresponding asynchronous model. Later than [2] but independently,
another model of asynchronous reactive systems together with a composition theorem
for reactive simulatability was developed in [16]. The theorem is specific for universal
simulatability, but for this case it is more general than the ones in [4, 2] since it addition-
ally allows for securely composing a polynomial number of copies of an ideal service,
which naturally correspond to different protocol instances in the real implementation.
We stress that our composition theorem in this paper not only captures secure com-
position of a polynomial number of copies of one single ideal system but also of a
polynomial number of truly arbitrary systems. However, our work was inspired by [16].
Besides considering composition as secure refinement, property-based composition
has received interest in the literature: It considers the question whether systems that
individually provide certain security properties still have these properties when they are
run in parallel with other systems. For safety and liveness, general theories of this kind
of compositionality exist [17–19], which are sufficient to reason about most functional
system properties. However, many security properties are not safety and liveness prop-
erties, in particular confidentiality. Compositional information flow properties were first
investigated in [20]. After that, much work has been devoted to identifying properties
which are preserved under composition like, e.g., restrictiveness [20, 21], forward cor-
rectability [22], or separability [23]. For certain security properties that are in general
not preserved under composition, it is known how to restrict composition in order to
preserve these properties [23, 24]. More recent work concentrated on a uniform basis to
reason about property-based composition [25, 26].
Somewhere between both notions of composition, so-called preservation theorems
exist, which state that specific properties are preserved under (reactive) simulatabil-
ity. Such theorems exist for integrity, fairness, liveness, and non-interference [27–32].
Moreover, relaxations of reactive simulatability have recently been proposed [33].
Finally, we mention that reactive simulatability has formed the basis for allowing
cryptographically accurate, formal analyses of security protocols: If cryptographic pro-
tocols should be verified using formal methods, cryptographic primitives are abstracted
based on the so-called Dolev-Yao abstraction [34], which considers cryptographic prim-
itives, e.g., E for encryption and D for decryption, as operators in a free algebra where
only predefined cancellation rules hold. Since this line of work turned out to be very
successful, the interesting question arose whether these abstractions are indeed justified
from the view of cryptography, i.e., whether properties proved for the abstractions are
still valid for the cryptographic implementation. Such cryptographic underpinnings of a
Dolev-Yao model were first addressed by Abadi and Rogaway in [35] and Laud [36] for
passive adversaries and symmetric encryption. . A full cryptographic justification for a
Dolev-Yao model, i.e., for arbitrary active attacks and within arbitrary surrounding in-
teractive protocols, was first given in [37, 38], with extensions in [39, 40], based on the
notion of reactive simulatability.2 Moreover, tailored tool support for this library was
subsequently added [43, 44], and several well-known security protocols were proved in
a computationally sound manner [45–50].
Outline. In Section 2 we review the model of reactive systems in asynchronous net-
works. Section 3 contains our composition theorem and its proof for black-box simu-
latability. In Section 4, we show that universal simulatability implies black-box simu-
latability and reasonable assumptions. In particular, this can be used to carry over our
composition theorem for universal simulatability.
2 Asynchronous Reactive Systems
In this section, we review our model for secure reactive systems in an asynchronous
network from [2]. Several definitions are only sketched whereas those that are important
for understanding our results are given in full detail. All other details can be looked up
in the original paper.
2.1 General System Model
Systems mainly consist of several interactive machines. Machines communicate via
ports (local endpoints for different potential channels) and messages are strings over an
alphabet Σ. Inspired by the CSP-Notation [51], we write output and input ports as q!
and q? respectively. As in similar models, channels are defined implicitly by naming
convention (and not by a separate graph), that is port q! sends messages to q?. For
asynchronous timing, a message is not immediately delivered to its recipient, but first
stored in a special machine q˜ called a buffer. If a machine wants to schedule the i-th
message of buffer q˜, it must have the unique clock-out port q⊳!, and it sends i at q⊳!,
see Figure 1. The buffer then outputs and deletes its i-th message. For a port p, we
write pc to denote the port which it connects to according to Figure 1, i.e., q!c = q↔?,
q↔!c = q?, q⊳!c = q⊳? and vice versa. The in- and output ports in a port set or port
sequence P are denoted in(P ) and out(P ).
Our primary machine model is probabilistic state-transition machines, similar to
probabilistic I/O automata as in Lynch [52] (and also essentially in [8, 9]). If a machine
is switched, it receives an input tuple at its input ports and performs its transition func-
tion. This yields a new state and an output tuple in the deterministic case, or a finite
2 In more recent work, drawing upon insides gained from the proof of the cryptographic library,
we showed that widely considered symbolic abstractions of hash functions and of the XOR op-
eration cannot be proven computationally sound in general, hence indicating that their current
symbolic representations might be overly simplistic [41, 42].
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Fig. 1. Ports and buffers. Specifications only need to spell out the black part.
distribution over such pairs in the probabilistic case. Moreover, each machine has a
function bounding the length of the considered inputs; this allows flexible time bounds
independent of the environment.
Definition 1. (Machines) A machine is a tuple
M = (nameM,PortsM, StatesM, δM, lM, IniM,FinM)
of a name nameM ∈ Σ+, a finite sequence PortsM of ports, a set StatesM ⊆ Σ∗ of
states, a probabilistic state-transition function δM, a length function lM : StatesM →
(N ∪ {∞})|in(PortsM)|, and sets IniM,FinM ⊆ StatesM of initial and final states. Its
input set is IM := (Σ∗)|in(PortsM)|; the i-th element of an input tuple denotes the input
at the i-th in-port. Its output set isOM := (Σ∗)|out(PortsM)|. The empty word, ǫ, denotes
no in- or output at a port. δM probabilistically maps each pair (s, I) ∈ StatesM × IM
to a pair (s′, O) ∈ StatesM ×OM.
Two restrictions apply to δM: Every output distribution has to be finite and if I =
(ǫ, . . . , ǫ), then δM(s, I) = (s, (ǫ, . . . , ǫ)). Inputs are ignored beyond the length bounds,
i.e., δM(s, I) = δM(s, I⌈lM(s)) for all I ∈ IM, where r⌈l for l ∈ N,r ∈ Σ∗ denotes the l-
symbol prefix, and the notation is lifted to tuples. We further demand lM(s) = (0, . . . , 0)
for every s ∈ FinM. ✸
In the text, we often write “M” for nameM. The set (in contrast to the sequence) of
ports of a machine M is denoted by ports(M), and similar for sets of machines.
A collection Cˆ of machines is a set of machines with pairwise different machine
names and disjoint sets of ports. The completion [Cˆ ] of a collection Cˆ is the union of
all machines of Cˆ and the buffers needed for every channel. A port of a collection is
called free if its connecting port is not in the collection. These ports will be connected to
the users and the adversary. The free ports of a completion [Cˆ ] are denoted as free([Cˆ ]).
A collection Cˆ is called closed if its completion [Cˆ ] has no free ports except a special
master clock-in port clk⊳?.
A closed collection represents a “runnable” system and a probability space of runs
(sometimes called traces or executions) is defined for it. Machines switch sequentially,
i.e., we have exactly one active machine M at any time. If this machine has clock out-
ports, it can select the next message to be delivered by scheduling a buffer via one
of these clock out-ports. If the buffer contains a message at the selected position, it
delivers this message, and the receiving machine is the next active machine. If M tries to
schedule multiple messages, only one is taken, and if it schedules none or the message
does not exist, the master scheduler X becomes active. Formally, runs are defined as
follows.
Definition 2. (Runs and Views) Let Cˆ be a closed collection with master scheduler X.
Runs and their probability spaces are defined inductively by the following algorithm
for each tuple ini ∈ ×M∈Cˆ IniM of initial states. The algorithm maintains variables for
the state of each machine and treats each port as a variable over Σ∗, initialized with ǫ
except for clk⊳? := 1. It further maintains a variable MCS (“current scheduler”) over
machine names, initially MCS := X, for the currently active non-buffer machine, and a
variable r for the resulting run, an initially empty list. The algorithm has five phases.
Probabilistic choices only occur in Phase 1.
1. Switch current scheduler: Switch the current machine MCS, i.e., set (s′, O) ←
δMCS(s, I) for its current state s and in-port values I . Then assign ǫ to all in-ports
of MCS.
2. Termination: If X is in a final state, the run stops. (As X made no outputs in this
case, this only prevents repeated master clock inputs.)
3. Store outputs: For each simple out-port o! of MCS with o! 6= ǫ, in their given order,
switch buffer o˜ with input o↔? := o!. Then assign ǫ to these ports o! and o↔?.
4. Clean up scheduling: If at least one clock out-port of MCS has a value 6= ǫ, let n⊳!
denote the first such port and assign ǫ to the others. Otherwise let clk⊳? := 1 and
MCS := X and go to Phase 1.
5. Deliver scheduled message: Switch buffer n˜ with input n⊳? := n⊳!, set n? := n↔!
and then assign ǫ to all ports of n˜ and to n⊳!. If n? = ǫ let clk⊳? := 1 and MCS := X.
Else let MCS := M′ for the unique machineM′ with n? ∈ ports(M′). Go to Phase 1.
Whenever a machine (this may be a buffer) M switches from (s, I) to (s′, O), we add
a step (nameM, s, I, s′, O) to the run r with the following two restrictions. First, we
cut each input according to the respective length function, i.e., we replace I by I ′ :=
I⌈lM(s). Secondly, we do not add the step to the run if I ′ = (ǫ, . . . , ǫ), i.e., if nothing
happens in reality. This gives a random variable runCˆ ,ini for each tuple ini ∈ ×M∈Cˆ
of initial states, and similarly for l-step prefixes runCˆ ,ini,l.
The view of a subset Mˆ ⊆ Cˆ of machines in a run r is the subsequence of r
consisting of those steps where a machine of Mˆ switches. This gives a random vari-
able view Cˆ ,ini(Mˆ ) for each tuple ini of initial states, and similarly for l-step prefixes
view Cˆ ,ini,l(Mˆ ) of the view. For a singleton Mˆ = {H} we write view Cˆ ,ini(H) for
view Cˆ ,ini({H}). ✸
2.2 Security-specific System Model
We now define specific collections for security purposes. We start with the definition
of structures. Intuitively, these are the machines that execute a security protocol. They
have a distinguished set of service ports. This is a subset of the free ports where, in-
tuitively, a certain service is guaranteed, while remaining free ports are meant only for
the adversary. Typical examples of inputs at service ports are “send message m to par-
ticipant id” for a message transmission system or “pay amount x to participant id” for
a payment system, while typical non-service ports are those of insecure network con-
nections in a real system. For cryptographic purposes, the initial state of all machines
in a structure is a security parameter k in unary representation.
Definition 3. (Structures and Service Ports) A structure is a pair struc = (Mˆ , S )
where Mˆ is a collection of simple machines (i.e., with only normal in- and out-ports
and clock out-ports) with {1}∗ ⊆ IniM for all M ∈ Mˆ , and S ⊆ free([Mˆ ]). The set S
is called service ports. ✸
Forbidden ports for users of a structure are those that clash with port names of given
machines and those that would link the user to a non-service port.
Definition 4. (Forbidden Ports) For a structure (Mˆ , S ) let S¯Mˆ := free([Mˆ ]) \ S . We
call forb(Mˆ , S ) := ports(Mˆ ) ∪ S¯ c
Mˆ
the forbidden ports. ✸
A system is a set of structures. The idea behind systems is that there may be different
actual structures depending on the set of actually malicious participants.
Definition 5. (Systems) A system Sys is a set of structures. ✸
A structure can be complemented to a configuration by adding a user machine and
an adversary machine. The user is restricted to connecting to the service ports. The
adversary closes the collection, i.e., it connects to the remaining service ports, the other
free ports S¯Mˆ of the collection, and the free ports of the user. Thus, user and adversary
can interact, e.g., for modeling active attacks.
Definition 6. (Configurations) A configuration of a structure (Mˆ , S ) is a tuple conf =
(Mˆ , S ,H,A) where
– H is a machine called user with ports(H) ∩ forb(Mˆ , S ) = ∅ and {1}∗ ⊆ IniH,
– A is a machine called adversary with {1}∗ ⊆ IniA,
– and the completion Cˆ := [Mˆ ∪ {H,A}] is a closed collection.
The set of configurations of (Mˆ , S ) is written Conf(Mˆ , S ). The notationConf() is lifted
to sets of structures, i.e., systems. We write conf .Mˆ for conf [1] (component selection
function) and similarly conf .S , conf .H, and conf .A, and conf .struc for conf [1, 2].✸
2.3 Parametrized Systems
In many typical systems, the structures only depend on the trust model, but not on the
security parameter k. In a parametrized system this is different. Hence such a system
is partitioned into different subsystems for different values of k. “Normal” systems can
naturally be identified with parametrized systems where all subsystems are equal.
Definition 7. (Parametrized Systems) A parametrized system is a system Sys together
with a partitioning (Sysk)k∈N, i.e., the elements Sysk are pairwise disjoint systems with
Sys =
⋃
k∈N Sysk. In slight abuse of notation we also call the sequence of partitions
Sys , and if the system is called Sys , the notation Sysk always refers to the k-th element
in the partition sequence.
A bounding function for a parametrized system is a function P such that for all
k ∈ N and (Mˆ , S ) ∈ Sysk we have |Mˆ | ≤ P (k) and the runtime of every M ∈ Mˆ on
initial input 1k is bounded by P (k) in the sense of circuit complexity (more precisely,
circuit size). A parametrized system is polynomial-time if it has a polynomial bounding
function. ✸
Circuit complexity, i.e., non-uniform complexity, is natural for this definition because
one can consider every machine M, used only for security parameter k, as a separate cir-
cuit. Meaningful uniform complexity for such a definition requires a universal machine
that simulates all these structures, and a generation algorithm for structures. However,
our results are reductions with concrete security (as first introduced as a general concept
with special notation in [53]), and usable for a wide range of complexity measures. In
those reductions we actually work with Turing complexity because it is defined in full
detail for our interacting machines.
A parametrized system considers the potentially used subsystems as potentially
available from the start. This is also implicitly the case in [16] because although a sub-
system is said to be generated there, it springs up magically in distributed locations by
this operation. This means that all the connections must be assumed to be predefined. A
truly dynamic system would need to distribute port or machine names of new machines,
like the π-calculus does. We do not see any specific reason while our theorem should
not hold for this case but it would require a rigorous definition first.
We now define user and adversary of a parametrized system.
Definition 8. (User and Adversary of a Parametrized System) A user and an adversary
of a parametrized system Sys are families (Hstruc)struc∈Sys , (Astruc)struc∈Sys such
that (Mˆ , S ,H(Mˆ ,S),A(Mˆ ,S)) ∈ Conf(Sys) for all (Mˆ , S ) ∈ Sys. ✸
To reason about the complexity of users and adversaries, or more generally families of
machines, we define the parametrized complexity.
Definition 9. (Parametrized Complexity) Let X = ⋃k∈N Xk be a partitioned index
set (with the same conventions as for systems) and let A = (Ax)x∈X be a family of
machines with {1}∗ ⊆ IniAx for every x ∈ X . We say that A is of complexity t : N→
N if for all x ∈ Xk, the runtime of Ax on initial input 1k is bounded by t(k) in the sense
of circuit complexity. We sometimes write tA for “the” complexity of A. ✸
2.4 Defining Security with Simulatability
Reactive simulatability essentially means that whatever might happen to an honest user
in a real system Sys1 can also happen in an ideal system Sys2. More precisely, for every
configuration conf 1 of Sys1, there exists a configuration conf 2 of Sys2 with the same
user yielding indistinguishable views for this user. A typical situation is illustrated in
Figure 2.
However, we do not want to compare a structure of Sys1 with arbitrary structures of
Sys2, but only with certain suitable ones. What suitable means in a concrete situation
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Fig. 2. Example of simulatability. The view of H is compared.
can be defined by a mapping f from Sys1 to Sys2. The mapping f is called valid if it
maps structures with the same service ports, so that the same user can connect.
Definition 10. (Valid Mappings) A valid mapping between two systems Sys1 and Sys2
is a function f : Sys1 → Sys2 with (Mˆ2, S2) = f((Mˆ1, S1)) ⇒ S1 = S2. We call
f((Mˆ1, S1)) the corresponding structure of (Mˆ1, S1). If the systems are parametrized,
we also require f(Sys1,k) ⊆ Sys2,k for all k ∈ N. ✸
A technical problem for reactive simulatability is that a correct user of a structure from
Sys1 might have forbidden ports in the corresponding structure. Configurations where
this does not happen are called suitable; we restrict the simulatability definition to those.
We omit a rigorous definition for brevity. For a valid mapping f : Sys1 → Sys2, let
Conff (Sys1) be the set of suitable configurations.
We present the definition of indistinguishability for two families of random vari-
ables with a common partitioned index set and with versions for concrete security, fol-
lowing [54–56].
Definition 11. (Indistinguishability) Let two families (varx)x∈X and (var′x)x∈X of dis-
crete probability distributions (random variables) on common domains (Dx)x∈X be
given with a partitioned index set X =
⋃
k∈N Xk (with the same conventions as for
systems).
– They are called perfectly indistinguishable iff varx = var′x for all x ∈ X .
– They are called statistically δ-indistinguishable for a function δ : N → R≥0 iff the
statistical distance ∆stat(varx, var′x) := 12
∑
d∈Dx
|Pr(varx = d) − Pr(var′x = d)|
is at most δ(k) for all k and all x ∈ Xk.
– An algorithm Dis is called a (t, δ)-distinguisher for varx and var′x for t ∈ N, δ ∈
R≥0, and x ∈ Xk iff its complexity is at most t and
δDisx := |Pr(Dis(1
k, varx) = 1)− Pr(Dis(1
k, var′x) = 1)| ≥ δ.
– The distributions are called polynomially indistinguishable iff for all polynomials
t and all distinguishers (Disx)x∈X with complexity t in their first parameter, there
exists a negligible function δ such that δDisx ≤ δ(k) for all k and all x ∈ Xk.
✸
We write “≈y” for indistinguishability with y = perf , δ, or poly, respectively. We write
“≈” if we want to treat all cases together, and we often write “=” for “≈perf”.
We later need that indistinguishability of families of random variables implies in-
distinguishability of functions of them, e.g., of “parts” of the random variables.
Lemma 1. (Indistinguishability of Derived Distributions) Let var, var′ be families of
probability distributions with partitioned index set X and a common family of domains
D, and let φ = (φx)x∈X be a family of functions φx on Dx (to strings, but encoding
domains as strings is not made explicit). Then the following holds:
– var ≈y var′ ⇒ φ(var) ≈y φ(var′) if y is perf , or a function δ.
– Every (t, δ)-distinguisher Disφ for φ(varx) and φ(var′x) gives rise to a (t′, δ)-
distinguisher Dis for varx and var′x with t′ = t + tφ(b(k)), where tφ : N → N
denotes the complexity of φ, and b : N → N bounds the length of the random vari-
ables, i.e., |v| ≤ b(k) for all v ∈ Dx and x ∈ Xk.
– var ≈poly var′ ⇒ φ(var) ≈poly φ(var′) if the random variables are of polynomial
length, and φ is of polynomial complexity.
✷
This is clear for the perfect case, and can be easily shown by computations on statistical
distances for the statistical case. For concrete complexity and the computational case,
the distinguisher family Dis for the original distributions is defined by Disx(1k, v) :=
Disφ,x(1
k, φ(v)) for all k and x ∈ Xk, and for v of length at most b(k).
We are now ready to define reactive simulatability for parametrized systems.
We require that there exists an extension fC of the valid structure mapping f to
a configuration mapping that leaves the user unchanged, i.e., we skolemize the ex-
istence of corresponding adversaries in Figure 2. We then consider the families of
user views viewconf 1(H) and view fC(conf 1)(H) where all machines have initial in-
put 1k for the security parameter k to which this configuration belongs. Each of
these two families contains one well-defined probability distribution for each con-
figuration conf 1. Overall these are two families of distributions with the partitioned
index set Conff (Sys1) =
⋃
k∈N Conf
f (Sys1,k). Similarly, we obtain two families
view conf 1,l(H) and view fC(conf 1),l(H) for l-step prefixes of user views.
Definition 12. (Reactive Simulatability) Let parametrized systems Sys1 and Sys2 with
a valid mapping f be given. For reactive simulatability, we require that there exists a
function fC : Conff (Sys1) → Conf(Sys2) with fC(conf 1).struc = f(conf 1.struc)
and fC(conf 1).H = conf 1.H for all conf 1 ∈ Conff (Sys1), and with the following
properties. We say that fC is a τ -mapping for a structure struc1 and a function τ : N→
N if the complexity tfC(conf 1).A is bounded by τ(tconf 1.A) for all conf 1 ∈ Conf(struc1).
The entire fC is a τ -mapping for a function τ : N2 → N if for all conf 1 ∈ Conff (Sys1)
we have tfC(conf 1).A ≤ τ(k, tconf 1).
We say that Sys1 ≥f,ysec Sys2, spoken “y′-at least as secure as”, under the following
conditions for different cases of y and y′, where we abbreviate H := conf 1.H:
a) y = perf and y′ = “perfectly” iff view conf 1(H) and view fC(conf 1)(H) are perfectly
indistinguishable for every conf 1 ∈ Conff (Sys1).
b) y = δ and y′ = “δ-statistically” for a function δ : N2 → R≥0 iff for ev-
ery conf 1 ∈ Conf
f (Sys1,k) and every l ∈ N we have view conf 1,l(H) ≈δ(k,l)
view fC(conf 1),l(H).
c) Concrete security: An algorithm Dis is called a (t, δ)-distinguisher for conf 1 ∈
Conff (Sys1,k) and fC(conf 1) where t ∈ N and δ ∈ R≥0 iff its complexity is at
most t and δDisconf 1 ≥ δ where
δDisconf 1 := |Pr(Dis(1
k, view conf 1(H)) = 1)− Pr(Dis(1
k, view fC(conf 1)(H)) = 1)|.
e) y = poly and y′ = “polynomially” iff for all users H and adversary A of poly-
nomial complexity, the views (view (Mˆ ,S ,H(Mˆ ,S),A(Mˆ ,S))(H(Mˆ ,S)))(Mˆ ,S)∈Sys1 and
(view fC((Mˆ ,S ,H(Mˆ ,S),A(Mˆ ,S)))
(H(Mˆ ,S)))(Mˆ ,S)∈Sys1
are polynomially indistinguish-
able and fC is a P -mapping for a polynomial P .
Universal simulatability means that fC(conf 1).A (i.e., A2 in Figure 2) for conf 1 =
(Mˆ1, S ,H,A1) only depends on Mˆ1, S , and A1. We write ≥uni,f,ysec instead of ≥f,ysec if we
want to emphasize this case. ✸
Where the difference between the types of security is irrelevant, we only write ≥fsec,
and we omit the indices f and sec if they are clear from the context.
An essential ingredient in the composition theorem and other uses of the model is a
notion of combining several machines into one, and a lemma that this makes no essen-
tial difference in views. The combination is defined in a canonical way by considering
a combined state space and letting each transition function operate on its respective
part. We omit details for brevity. The combination of a set Mˆ of machines is written
comb(Mˆ ) and we sometimes write comb(M1, . . . ,Mj) for comb({M1, . . . ,Mj}).
Lemma 2. (Machine Combination) Let Cˆ be a collection without buffers, and Dˆ ⊆ Cˆ .
The view of every set of original machines in (Cˆ \ Dˆ) ∪ {comb(Dˆ)} is the same as
in Cˆ . This includes the view of the submachines in comb(Dˆ), which is well-defined
given Cˆ and Dˆ . The Turing complexity of comb(Dˆ) is the sum of the complexities of
the machines in comb(Dˆ). ✷
We can now add the notion of blackbox simulatability to Definition 12. Here A2 is given
as the combination of a fixed “simulator” Sim and a machine A′1 that is identical to A1
up to port renaming.
Definition 13. (Blackbox Simulatability) With the notation of Definition 12, blackbox
simulatability means that we have functions fSim from Sys1 to machines (the simu-
lators for the structures) and fσ from Sys1 to port renaming functions such that for
all conf 1 = (Mˆ1, S ,H,A1) ∈ Conff (Sys1) we have fC(conf 1) = (Mˆ2, S ,H,A2)
with (Mˆ2, S ) = f((Mˆ1, S )) and A2 = comb(Sim,A′1) with Sim := fSim((Mˆ1, S1))
and A′1 := fσ((Mˆ1, S1))(A1). For computational security, we require that Sim is
polynomial-time, i.e., that the parametrized complexity of (fSim((Mˆ1, S )))(Mˆ1,S)∈Sys1
is polynomially bounded. We write ≥bbsec instead of ≥sec if we want to emphasize this
case (with the respective superscripts). ✸
2.5 Composition
When composing several systems, one typically does not want to compose every struc-
ture of one system with every structure of the others, but only with certain matching
ones. For instance, if the individual machines of Sys2 are implemented on the same
physical devices as those of Sys1, as usual in a layered distributed system, we only
compose structures corresponding to the same set of corrupted physical devices. How-
ever, this is not the only conceivable situation. Hence we do not define a composition
operator that produces one specific composition, but a set of possible compositions.
Definition 14. (Composability and Composition of Structures) We call structures
(Mˆ1, S1), . . . , (Mˆn, Sn) composable if ports(Mˆi) ∩ forb(Mˆj , Sj) = ∅ and Si ∩
free([Mˆj ]) = Sj ∩ free([Mˆi]) for all i 6= j.3 We then define their composition as
(Mˆ1, S1)|| . . . ||(Mˆn, Sn) := (Mˆ , S ) with Mˆ := Mˆ1 ∪ . . . ∪ Mˆn and S := (S1 ∪
. . . ∪ Sn) ∩ free([Mˆ ]). ✸
We now define the composition of variably many systems, i.e., there is a potentially
infinite supply of systems from which a finite number P (k) is chosen for composition
for each security parameter k.
Definition 15. (Parametrized Composition of Systems) Let a sequence Sysseq =
(Sys(i))i∈N be given where each Sys(i) is a parametrized system, and let P : N → N
be a function. Then a P -sized composition of Sysseq is a parametrized system Sys∗
where for all k ∈ N, every structure (Mˆ ∗, S ∗) ∈ Sys∗k has a unique representation
(Mˆ ∗, S ∗) = (Mˆ1, S1)|| . . . ||(MˆP (k), SP (k)) with composable structures (Mˆi, Si) ∈
Sys
(i)
k for i = 1, . . . , P (k).We call (Mˆi, Si) the restriction of (Mˆ ∗, S ∗) to Sys(i) and
write (Mˆi, Si) = (Mˆ ∗, S ∗)⌈Sys(i) . ✸
If the systems Sys(i) have a joint bounding functionQ, then P ·Q is a bounding function
for Sys∗. In particular, if P and Q are polynomials, then Sys∗ is polynomial-time.
3 General Composition Theorem for Blackbox Simulatability
In this section, we show that reactive blackbox simulatability is consistent with the
composition of a parametrized number of systems, in particular polynomially many in
the computational case. The basic idea is the following: Assume that we have proven
that a potentially infinite supply of systems Sys(i) are as secure as systems Sys ′(i) in the
sense of black-box simulatability. Now we want to use Sys(i) as a secure replacement
for Sys ′(i), i.e., as an implementation of the ideal system Sys ′(i). The following theorem
shows that such modular proofs are possible. The situation is shown in the upper part
of Figure 3.
Additional conditions in the theorem are that all corresponding structures are com-
posable and that, for the polynomial case, the security of the system is in certain sense
uniform.
3 The first condition makes one structure a valid user of another. The second one excludes cases
where p ∈ free([Mˆi])∩free([Mˆj ]) (e.g., a clock port for a connection between these structures)
and p ∈ Si but p 6∈ Sj .
Theorem 1. (Secure Parametrized Composition, Blackbox Case) Let Sysseq =
(Sys(i))i∈N and Sysseq ′ = (Sys ′(i))i∈N be sequences of parametrized systems. Let
f = (f (i))i∈N be a sequence of valid mappings f (i) : Sys(i) → Sys ′(i), and let
Sys(i) ≥bb,f
(i),yi
sec Sys
′(i) for all i ∈ N.
Let P : N→ N, and let Sys# and Sys∗ denote the P -sized compositions of Sysseq
and Sysseq ′, respectively. Assume that the following structural conditions hold for all
k ∈ N and every structure (Mˆ#, S ) ∈ Sys#k : Let its restrictions be (Mˆi, Si) :=
(Mˆ#, S )⌈Sys(i) and the corresponding structures (Mˆ ′i , Si) := f (i)((Mˆi, Si)) for all
i ≤ P (k). Then the composition
f#((Mˆ#, S )) := (Mˆ ′1, S1) || · · · || (Mˆ
′
P (k), SP (k))
exists and lies in Sys∗k. Furthermore, (Mˆi, Si) and (Mˆ ′j , Sj) must be composable for
j 6= i, and ports(Mˆ ′i ) ∩ S cj = ports(Mˆi) ∩ S cj for all j 6= i. Then we have
Sys# ≥bb,f
#,y
sec Sys
∗
a) with y = perf if yi = perf for all i ∈ N.
b) with y = P (k) · δ(k, b(k)) if all yi are bounded by a function δ : N2 → R≥0, and
where b(k) is the sum of the complexity of the systems, the user, and the simulators.
c) With concrete complexity: For every conf # ∈ Conff#(Sys#k ), a (t, δ)-
distinguisher for conf # and fC(conf #) gives rise to a (t′, δ′)-distinguisher for
conf (i) and fC(conf (i)) for a conf (i) ∈ Conf(Sys(i)k ) with δ′ = δP (k) and
t′ = t + b′(k), where b′(k) is a polynomial independent of tconf #.A. (Details are
given in the proof.)
d) with y = poly if yi = poly for all i ∈ N and under the following conditions: The
function P is polynomially bounded, and the systems Sys(i) have a joint bounding
polynomial Q. The complexities of the simulator families induced by the mappings
f
(i)
Sim are bounded by a joint polynomial QSim. The distinguishing probabilities of
the system pairs (Sys(i), Sys ′(i)) are uniformly bounded, i.e., for all polynomials t
there exists a negligible function δ such that for all distinguishers Dis, all i, k ∈ N,
and all conf = (Mˆi, Si,H,A) ∈ Conff
(i)
(Sys
(i)
k ) we have (tDis ≤ t(k) ∧ tH ≤
t(k) ∧ tA ≤ t(k))⇒ δDisconf ≤ δ(k) (recall Definition 12d).
✷
The first statement to be proved is extracted into the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Under the conditions of Theorem 1, the mapping f# is a valid mapping
between Sys# and Sys∗. ✷
The proof is straightforward as in [4], but heavy on notation. Hence we omit it in this
short version. Recall that blackbox simulatability was defined by a function that selects
one fixed simulator for each structure (Definition 13).
Definition 16. (Simulator and Corresponding Configurations) Under the conditions of
Theorem 1 and for all i ∈ N, let f (i)Sim and f (i)A be the simulator and renaming func-
tions from which f (i)C is composed by blackbox simulatability. We compose them into
functions f#Sim and f#A on Sys# as follows: Given k ∈ N and (Mˆ#, S ) ∈ Sys#k , let
Simi := f
(i)
Sim((Mˆi, Si)) for all i ≤ P (k), and let
f
#
Sim((Mˆ
#, S )) := comb(Sim1, . . . , SimP (k));
further let f#A := f (P (k))A ◦ · · · ◦ f (1)A . Let f#C be constructed from f#, f#Sim, and f#A by
the equations in Definition 13 (blackbox simulatability). ✸
The complexity tSim of the simulator is tSim(k) =
∑P (k)
i=1 tSimi(k) by Lemma 2. In the
polynomial case, there exists a polynomial QSim such that tSimi ≤ QSim for all i, hence
tSim(k) is polynomially bounded by P (k) ·QSim(k).
We also omit the technical proof that indeed f#C : Conf
f#(Sys#) → Conf(Sys∗)
in Definition 16. It is nevertheless interesting that these proof parts that verify the com-
patibility of channels and the difference of service ports and adversary ports in compo-
sitions make up the major part of a rigorous proof, while the cryptographic aspects are
shorter and more standard.
Now we can concentrate on proving that the simulator simulates correctly. The proof
consists of a hybrid argument as first used in [5], i.e., we construct intermediate config-
urations that differ only in the machines of one system.
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Fig. 3. Configurations in the composition theorem for blackbox simulatability.
Proof (Theorem 1). Let a configuration conf # = (Mˆ#, S ,H,A) ∈ Conff#(Sys#k ) be
given and conf ∗ := f#C (conf
#) the corresponding configuration according to Defini-
tion 16. Let the sub-structures (Mˆi, Si) and (Mˆ ′i , S ′i), the simulators Simi, and functions
fxz with various indices be defined as in the formulation of the theorem and Defini-
tion 16. Furthermore, let (Mˆ ∗, S ) := f∗((Mˆ#, S )) and Sim := f#Sim((Mˆ#, S )). Then
we have conf ∗ = (Mˆ ∗, S ,H, comb(Sim, f#A (A))); recall that f
#
A is just a port renam-
ing; hence Figure 3 simplifies it to A.
The outline of the hybrid argument is as follows.
1. We define hybrid configurations conf hybi of Sys(i) and conf ′hybi of Sys ′(i) for i =
1, . . . , P (k). In conf hybi the first i−1 real structures have already been replaced with
their ideal counterparts, while in conf ′hybi also the i-th structure has been replaced.
To make these configurations correct configurations of the respective systems, all
other machines are grouped into an overall hybrid user Hhybi as shown at the bottom
of Figure 3 for i = 2 and P (k) = 3.
2. We show that these are correct and corresponding configurations with respect to the
given blackbox simulatability between Sys(i) and Sys ′(i).
3. We show that the views of H in conf ′hybi and conf
hyb
i+1 are equal for i =
1, . . . , P (k) − 1. Moreover, we show that the views of H are equal in conf # and
conf
hyb
1 , and in conf
′hyb
P (k) and conf
∗
. This gives a kind of indistinguishability chain
(for one configuration)
view conf #(H) ≈ view conf hyb1
(H) ≈ · · · ≈ view
conf
′hyb
P(k)
(H) ≈ view conf ∗(H).
4. We show that this implies indistinguishability between first and last elements.
We now explain these steps in more detail.
Step 1: For i = 1, . . . , P (k), let the machine collection for the i-th hybrid user be Hˆi :=
{H} ∪
⋃
1≤j<i Mˆ
′
j ∪ {Simj | 1 ≤ j < i} ∪
⋃
i<j≤P (k) Mˆj , and let H
hyb
i := comb(Hˆi).
Furthermore let Ai := f (i−1)A ◦ · · · ◦ f
(1)
A (A) and A′i := f
(i)
A (Ai). Then we define the
hybrid configurations as
conf
hyb
i := (Mˆi, Si,H
hyb
i ,Ai);
conf
′hyb
i := (Mˆ
′
i , Si,H
hyb
i , comb(Simi,A
′
i)).
For the computational case, we have to show that the family of Hhybi is polynomial-time.
This holds since t
H
hyb
i
≤ tH + tSim + tMˆ# + tMˆ ∗ by Lemma 2, where each addend is
polynomially bounded by assumption.
Step 2: We have to show that conf hybi ∈ Conf
fi(Sys i) and conf
′hyb
i ∈ Conf(Sys
′
i), i.e.,
essentially that the hybrid users do not use non-service ports. In this short version, we
omit this proof. Then the definition of conf hybi and conf
′hyb
i immediately implies
conf
′hyb
i = f
(i)
C (conf
hyb
i ), (1)
i.e., these are indistinguishable configurations under the given blackbox simulatability
between Sys(i) and Sys ′(i).
Step 3: The configurations conf ′hybi and conf
hyb
i+1 consist of the same collection of ma-
chines Cˆi := Hˆi∪{Mˆ ′i , Simi,A′i}. Combining them in different ways does not alter the
view of H by Lemma 2. Thus we have
view
conf
′hyb
i
(H) = view
conf
hyb
i+1
(H) (2)
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , P (k)}, and similarly
view conf #(H) = view conf hyb1
(H) ∧ view
conf
hyb
P (k)
(H) = view conf ∗(H). (3)
Step 4: We now distinguish the type of the given simulatability relations
Sys(i) ≥bb,f
(i),yi
sec Sys
′(i)
.
For perfect simulatability, Equation (1) gives us view
conf
hyb
i
(H) = view
conf
′hyb
i
(H)
for all i. With Equations (2) and (3) this yields view conf #(H) = view conf ∗(H). This
result for an arbitrary fixed configuration conf # implies equality of all families of such
views.
For statistical simulatability, let Sys(i) be δi-statistically at least as secure as Sys ′(i).
Let l ∈ N. For prefixes of length l and v ranging over the potential views of this length,
we abbreviate q#v := Pr(view conf#,l(H) = v), and q∗v := Pr(view conf ∗,l(H) = v),
and qi,v := Pr(view conf hyb
i
,l
(H) = v) and q′i,v := Pr(view conf ′hyb
i
,l
(H) = v) for all i.
For all potential views v , we have q′i,v = qi+1,v and q#v = q1,v and q′P (k),v = q∗v by
Equations (2) and (3). The desired statistical distance is
δstat(conf
#) :=
1
2
∑
v
|q#v − q
∗
v |
=
1
2
∑
v
|q1,v − q2,v + q2,v − q3,v + · · ·+ qP (k),v − q
′
P (k),v |
≤
1
2
∑
v
(|q1,v − q2,v |+ |q2,v − q3,v |+ · · ·+ |qP (k),v − q
′
P (k),v |)
=
P (k)∑
i=1
1
2
∑
v
|qi,v − q
′
i,v |
=
P (k)∑
i=1
∆stat(view conf hyb
i
,l
(H), view
conf
′hyb
i
,l
(H)).
With Lemma 1 this gives
δstat(conf
#) ≤
P (k)∑
i=1
∆stat(view conf hyb
i
,li
(Hhybi ), view conf ′hyb
i
,li
(Hhybi )) ≤
P (k)∑
i=1
δ(k, li),
where the li are sufficiently large numbers to ensure that the l-step prefix of the view
of H in conf hybi is a subsequence of the li-step prefix of the view of H
hyb
i . A general
bound is the complexity of Hhybi , which is bounded by b := tH + tMˆ# + tMˆ ∗ + tSim.
This implies δstat(conf #) ≤ P (k) · δ(k, b(k)) as desired.
For concrete complexity and for a (t,∆Dis)-distinguisher Dis, we have by definition
∆Dis ≤ |Pr(Dis(1k, view conf #(H)) = 1)− Pr(Dis(1
k, view conf ∗(H)) = 1)|.
We abbreviate q# := Pr(Dis(1k, view conf #(H)) = 1) and q∗ := Pr(Dis(1k,
view conf ∗(H)) = 1), and qi := Pr(Dis(1k, view conf hyb
i
(H)) = 1) and q′i := Pr(Dis(1k,
view
conf
′hyb
i
(H)) = 1) for all i, and ∆i := |qi − q′i|. Now Equations (2) and (3) yield
∆Dis = |q# − q∗| = |q1 − q2 + q2 − q3 + q3 + · · ·+ qP (k) − q
′
P (k)|
≤ |q1 − q2|+ |q2 − q3|+ · · ·+ |qP (k) − q
′
P (k)| = ∆1 +∆2 + · · ·+∆P (k).
This implies that there exists some i with ∆i ≥ ∆
Dis
P (k) .
We can now consider Dis as a (t,∆i)-distinguisher Dis(i)φ of a function φ of views
of the actual user Hhybi of the i-th hybrid systems. Here φ is defined by φ(v) :=
v⌈H, i.e., the restriction to the view of H. The complexity tφ of φ is linear. Hence
Lemma 1 implies that there exists a (ti, ∆i)-distinguisher Dis(i) for view conf hyb
i
(Hhybi )
and view
conf
′hyb
i
(Hhybi ) with ti = t+ b′(k), where b′(k) bounds the length of the views
of Hhybi . The complexity tHhyb
i
of Hhybi is bounded by b = tH + tMˆ# + tMˆ ∗ + tSim, and
above we showed tSim ≤ P · QSim. The length of runs and thus views in our current
representation is bounded by the square of this complexity (but this might be improv-
able by tighter encoding). This yields the desired polynomial bound b′(k) independent
of the adversary complexity.
For polynomial simulatability, let H, A be a user and an adversary for Sys# of com-
plexity tH and tA, and let t be a polynomial and Dis a distinguisher family of complexity
t. Then the functions t
H
hyb
i
, ti, and tAi = tA are polynomials. By assumption, there ex-
ists a negligible function δ that uniformly bounds the advantage of distinguishers for the
given system pairs for the complexity function max(ti, tHhyb
i
, tAi). Now let a configura-
tion conf # = (Mˆ#, S ,H(Mˆ#,S),A(Mˆ#,S)) be given. The concrete security considera-
tions and Equation (1) imply ∆i = δDis(i)
conf
hyb
i
≤ δ(k), and therefore δDis
conf#
≤ P (k) ·δ(k)
is negligible. This proves the desired polynomial indistinguishability of the families of
user views over Sys# and Sys∗.
4 From Black-Box to Universal Simulatability
We now show a relation between universal simulatability and black-box simulatability.
It allows us to apply our general composition theorem to universal simulatability under
reasonable assumptions, but it also is of independent interest. More precisely, we show
that universal simulatability for two parametrized systems Sys1 and Sys2 is equivalent
to black-box simulatability if Sys1 fulfills the following structural requirements: When-
ever a clock-out port of a structure (Mˆ1, S1) ∈ Sys1 is contained in S¯ c1 , then so is either
the corresponding input or output port. This means that the adversary is not allowed
to schedule messages of a connection where it is neither the sender nor the recipient.
This condition is naturally fulfilled for insecure channels, since the adversary is inserted
between the connections of two machines of the system.
Theorem 2. (Relating Black-box and Universal Simulatability) Let Sys1, Sys2 be two
parametrized systems with a valid mapping f , where for every structure (Mˆ1, S1) ∈
Sys1, we have p⊳! ∈ S¯ c1 ⇒ (p? ∈ S¯ c1 ∨ p! ∈ S¯ c1 ). Then Sys1 ≥bb,f,ysec Sys2 iff
Sys1 ≥
uni,f,y
sec Sys2 for y = perf or a function δ and also for y = poly if Sys1 is
polynomial-time.
For concrete security, if ≥uni,fsec is given with a τ -mapping fC, then we obtain ≥bb,fsec
with simulator complexity τ(tSys1), and a (t, δ)-distinguisher for the views in the black-
box case gives rise to a (t′, δ)-distinguisher for the views in the universal case where t′
is the sum of t and the view length of H and A. ✷
Proof. The left-to-right direction is clear by definition. The difficult direction is to show
that universal simulatability implies black-box simulatability. Due to lack of space, we
can only present a short sketch. This direction essentially consists of four steps:
1. Let a configuration conf 1 = (Mˆ1, S ,H,A1) of the sub-system Sys1,k be given. We
first derive another configuration conf uni1 = (Mˆ1, S ,Huni,A′1) of Sys1 as follows:
We insert a machine TSP ,b,k, called transparent scheduler, into the connections
between A1 and the simple ports in S¯1. It forwards messages between machines
of the structure and the adversary. Its parameters P and b correspond to the ports
that the transparent scheduler connects to and a bound on its runtime, which is the
joint runtime of the machines in Mˆ1. This machine only depends on Mˆ1, S , and k.
The new user is the combination Huni := comb(H,A1), and the new adversary is
A′1 := TSP ,b,k. We show that the views of both H and A1 are identical in the two
configurations.
2. We now show that conf uni1 ∈ Conf
f (Sys1) and apply the precondition Sys1 ≥uni,fsec
Sys2. This yields an indistinguishable configuration conf uni2 of Sys2 with a new
adversary A2. By the definition of universal simulatability, A2 only depends on Mˆ1,
S and on A′1 = TSP ,b,k. Since TSP ,b,k only depends on Mˆ1 and S , the adversary
A2 also only depends on Mˆ1 and S .
3. We obtain a configuration conf 2 with the original user and a simulator from conf
uni
2
by reversing the combination of H and A1 into Huni, and by defining the simulator
as Sim := A2. We show that this does not affect the view of H.
4. Combining several equalities between views of H in different configurations and
one indistinguishability gives the same class of indistinguishability.
Summarized statements follow from this treatment per configuration, i.e., with concrete
security (although details are omitted here), as usual.
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